Iwo Jima 1945 Page 9

  On 27 February RCT 23 faced Hill 382 on 4th Division’s left flank but its 3rd Battalion had to capture a ruined radar station before it could begin its ascent. The Marines struggled to advance until tanks reached the front line in the afternoon but even then artillery and mortar fire stopped them from taking the summit. RCT 23 made good progress on 28 February and while 1st Battalion moved across the hill’s northern slopes, 2nd Battalion advanced along a ravine to the south. By the end of the day Colonel Wensinger was pleased to report that his Marines had nearly surrounded the hill.

  On 27 February RCT 25 faced the Turkey Knob in 4th Division’s centre and Colonel Lanigan planned to surround the rocky outcrop and then look for ways to reach the hilltop bunker. 3rd Battalion advanced 200 metres on the right but 2nd Battalion hardly made any progress up the slopes of the Amphitheatre in the centre. 1st Battalion’s advance on the left was delayed until the afternoon but it did not go far after hidden anti-tank guns knocked out three tanks.

  ROCKET MEN

  The rocket trucks of the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment were able to deliver a devastating barrage of 4.5-inch rockets against a Japanese strongpoint. However, they were easy to spot and vulnerable to counterbattery fire. Each section of six trucks became adapt at driving into position, firing two salvoes, and withdrawing to safety before the Japanese artillery could retaliate. It took less than five minutes to fire a total of 432 rockets.

  RCT 25 repeated its attempt to surround the Turkey Knob on 28 February, only this time 1st Battalion tried to advance around both sides of the outcrop. The left hook was stopped by a camouflaged nest of bunkers and while reinforcements moved up, the right hook attacked; it too was stopped in its tracks. Neither 2nd nor 3rd Battalion could help out and mortars had to smother the Turkey Knob with smoke while 1st Battalion withdrew to safety.

  In the early hours of 1 March a shell hit 4th Division’s ammunition dump, filling the night sky with explosions. It took five hours to douse the fires, by which time 20 per cent of the division’s supply of ammunition was lost. Another shell had also disabled V Corps artillery fire direction centre.

  RCT 24 relieved RCT 23 on 1 March and while Colonel Jordan had orders to clear Hill 382, his attack was delayed for three hours waiting for artillery support. Although all three battalions advanced, they were stopped by heavy fire on the reverse slopes and the summit remained in Japanese hands.

  As the battle grew to a climax and the surviving Japanese troops were pushed into a corner, the fighting became more desperate. Marines hug the rocks as a demolition charge explodes in a mass of flames and smoke. (NARA-127-GW-114292)

  Tanks and rocket launchers plastered Hill 382 until they had to withdraw and then the Marines moved in. Major Frank E. Garretson, 2nd Battalion’s executive officer, later explained the means that had to be used to clear the hill. ‘Artillery and naval gunfire was paving the way out in front, but the resistance close in had to be dealt with as usual by the attacking companies employing hand grenades, rifles, and automatic rifles, 60mm mortars, flamethrowers, demolitions, and bazookas.’ On the afternoon of 2 March Colonel Jordan finally reported that Hill 382 had been taken.

  The poor weather on 4 March affected General Cates’ plans the same as the rest. While airstrikes had to be cancelled, artillery observers found it difficult to find targets. The Marines would have noticed that the amount of Japanese artillery fire had fallen since the fall of Hill 382 and its accuracy had noticeably worsened. Instead Japanese soldiers were hiding in camouflaged positions until the Marines were so close that they could not use their support weapons. Attempts to advance down the reverse slopes towards Higashi over the next 48 hours came to nothing; RCT 24 was exhausted.

  RCT 25 renewed the pincer attack on the Turkey Knob on 1 March but yet again 1st Battalion’s hooks were unable to surround the outcrop and mortars created a smoke screen so the Marines could gather up their casualties and withdraw to safety. Colonel Lanigan chose to make a surprise attack on 2 March and 1st Battalion moved out before dawn, creeping forward round the north side of the Turkey Knob for 20 minutes before they were spotted. Then all hell was let loose and the Marines had to fight for their lives until eight tanks could reach them. They fired hundreds of 75mm shells and squirted over 1000 gallons of flamethrower fuel at the blockhouse but the garrison refused to abandon their hilltop position. As night fell Colonel Lanigan had to yet again recall his men to safer positions.

  A LENGTHY, DEADLY PROCESS

  It took several days to clear all the bunkers and caves on Hill 382; 4th Division’s operations officerdescribed RCT 24’s mopping up operation: ‘It appears that there are underground passageways leading into the defences on Hill 382 and when an occupant of a pillbox is killed another one comes up to take his place. This is a rather lengthy process.’.

  Two battalions tried to sneak past the Turkey Knob early on 3 March and while 2/24th Battalion closed in from the northeast, 1/23rd Battalion crept past the Amphitheatre until it was spotted. The Marines had to wait behind cover until engineers cleared a route forward for a flame tank, and as it smothered the blockhouse in burning liquid, 1/23rd Battalion continued their advance. The story was the same on 4 March: heavy casualties and a small advance because RCT 23 was also exhausted. Late in the afternoon General Schmidt issued orders instructing all divisions to dig in for the night; after 14 days of constant battling, the Marines needed a well-deserved rest.

  Soft sand and rough terrain limited where tanks could operate. The leading tank has become bogged down in a huge crater; the second has lost a track. (NARA-127-GW-111039)

  On 4 March the first B-29 Superfortress, Dinah Might, landed on Iwo Jima so it could carry out emergency repairs as it returned from a raid over Tokyo. The sight of the huge plane taking off and heading for its home base gave the Marines a morale boost. (NARA-127-GW-112392)

  By this stage of the battle many companies were at half strength or less and battalion commanders had to transfer men between companies to keep them in action while the headquarters and support weapons companies were ordered to send men forward to the rifle companies. Companies, platoons and squads had lost too many leaders, and it took time to integrate the replacements with the veterans. 26th Marines, for example, had its original strength of 3256 reduced to 2153 effectives; 464 were newcomers. Colonel Graham could only rate his regiment’s combat efficiency at less than 50 per cent and it was the same situation across all three divisions.

  The day of rest allowed time for new plans to be made. Two weeks of sustained bombardment had altered Iwo Jima’s terrain beyond all recognition, rendering many operational maps worthless. A public relations photographer was ordered to carry out an improvised aerial photography mission to try and restore the situation. He took many photographs of the island and after they had been developed and enlarged they were distributed to the divisions. Intelligence officers in turn studied them to gain a better understanding of the terrain.

  5th Division’s Advance to Kitano Ravine (D+15 to D+19)

  5th Division wanted to clear Hill 362-B on its right flank on 6 March but 2/27th Marines was hit by a counter barrage at zero hour and never recovered. 1/26th and 3/26th Marines extended the attack across 5th Division’s sector in the afternoon but to no avail. 5th Division had to ask for help from carrier planes: ‘Request close support planes be armed maximum amount napalm for duration operation. Urgent need in ravines along northeast coast…’ It appeared that the Japanese only feared fire.

  By 7 March, ammunition expenditure was outstripping supply and everyone agreed that artillery barrages were having little effect on the Japanese troops. Corps and division artillery were ordered to reduce the number of firing missions while V Amphibious Corps insisted on something different: pre-dawn surprise attacks. Recent experience in 4th Division’s zone had shown that progress could be made by creeping across the rugged terrain in complete silence. The plan was for them to be deep into the Japanese lines before they were spotted. Then the Marines faced a fight fo
r survival until the tanks could get forward.

  RCT 26 advanced 200 metres beyond Kita before dawn on 7 March, bypassing several strongpoints before they were spotted. Colonel Graham’s Marines then had to fight for their lives to hold the ground they had taken. Meanwhile, RCT 28 continued to inch forward along the rocky, gorge-cut north coast. On the right flank 2/27th Marines were pinned down in a steep-sided gully beyond Hill 362-B and as tanks could not reach them, the Marines manhandled a 37mm gun forward; it was unable to make a difference and they had to withdraw.

  The drive for the east coast, D+15 and D+19 (6–10 March.)

  On 8 March General Rockey received V Amphibious Corps’s new order, an order issued to all three divisions: ‘capture the remainder of the island.’ As RCT 28 advanced another 400 metres along the north coast, ships fired into the caves and ravines ahead of the Marines. It was a different story for RCT 26; they were unable to make progress through the maze of pillboxes and caves around Kita. 2/27th Battalion was also struggling to advance until Lieutenant Jack Lummus, a popular officer who played for the New York Giants football team before the war, was mortally wounded. Lummus had single-handedly made the hard yards, knocking out the two strongpoints stopping his platoon and encouraging his men to advance while directing tanks forward. After knocking out a third emplacement Lummus was fatally wounded by a land mine and it was all too much for Company E. Lummus’s men rushed forward in a surge of fury, making the 300-yard dash to the cliff top overlooking the sea. Lummus had been a constant inspiration to his men since D-Day and his death was just too much; he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

  5th Division had to clear out dozens of caves along the rugged northern coastline. Flamethrowers were used to kill or injure anyone inside and then the engineers moved in with their explosives. (NARA-111-SC-208586)

  On 5th Division’s left flank, RCT 28 also continued its coastal advance until it came to the edge of a deep gorge known as Kitano Ravine. Colonel Liversedge was advised not to send his Marines down to investigate until it had been surrounded because it was believed that General Kuribayashi and 109th Division headquarters were in the maze of caves below. They had possibly been joined by part of 2nd Battalion, 145th Regiment and 3rd Battalion, 17th Independent Mixed Regiment. A large number of stragglers had also made their way into the narrow gorge.

  AN HONOURABLE DEATH

  During the night of on 8 March, Private First Class James D. La Belle of 27th Marines’ Weapons Company was on watch in his foxhole when a grenade landed close by. With no time to pick it up, he shouted a warning to his two buddies and dived on the missile; he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

  RCT 26 and RCT 27 Marines continued to edge forward on 9 March, pushing the Japanese defenders towards Kitano Point but many chose to fight to the death or commit suicide because they had nowhere to hide. When 1/27th Battalion came under enfilade fire, Sergeant Joseph R. Julian ordered his machine guns to return fire while he rushed the pillbox and knocked it out with a satchel charge and white phosphorus grenades; he then grabbed a discarded rifle and killed the escaping soldiers. Julian went on to silence two more cave positions with another Marine and was mortally wounded while trying to knock out another pillbox with a bazooka; he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

  Between 25 February and 10 March, 5th Division had advanced 3000 metres along the north coast of Iwo Jima and it had suffered 4292 casualties; around a third were killed or mortally wounded and the rest were wounded or evacuated with combat fatigue. To compensate for the losses, General Rockey ordered Colonel Waller to release 10 per cent of the men from 13th Marine Artillery Regiment to reinforce the infantry regiments; they were at the limit of their endurance.

  3rd Division’s Advance to the East Coast (D+15 to D+19)

  General Erskine’s Marines were advancing across Nature’s own hell east of Airfield 3, enduring the heat and stench caused by sulphur bubbling up through fissures and crevices in the rocky ground. Although tanks were ideal for suppressing the Japanese positions, there were only a few natural trails through the rocks and they were littered with mines and covered by anti-tank guns. The Marines pushed on alone while the engineers and bulldozers cleared routes forward.

  2/21st Battalion advanced early on 6 March and reached the summit of Hill 357 during the afternoon, giving Major Percy’s Marines a commanding view of the east coast. RCT 9 attacked an hour later but it could not clear Hill 362-A. 3/9th Battalion made a surprise attack on Hill 362-A the following morning and advanced through a smoke screen for 30 minutes before a burst of machine-gun fire alerted every Japanese soldier in the area. As the sky began to lighten, Lieutenant Colonel Boehm noticed that his leading company had only reached Hill 331; Hill 362-A was another 250 metres to the southeast. He had been sent in the right direction but towards the wrong objective.

  Tanks struggled to find suitable routes across the rough landscape but were always very welcome when they could find a way through. This squad are escorting a tank dozer as it carves a route to the front line. (NARA-127-GW-114025)

  All Boehm could do was to organise a new attack, only this time the Japanese were waiting and his Marines came under fire from all sides. Although progress was slow and casualties were high, 3/9th Battalion captured Hill 362-C before nightfall. Lieutenant Colonel Boehm summed up the attack as follows:

  Most notable in the night attack was the fact that, although nearly all the basic dope was bad, the strategy proved very sound, since it turned out that the open ground taken under cover of darkness was the most heavily fortified of all terrain captured that day, and the enemy occupying this vital ground were taken completely by surprise (actually sleeping in their pillboxes and caves) … It should be kept in mind, however, that a stroke of luck went a long way toward making the attack a success.

  RCT 9 renewed its attack at first light on 7 March but it had only advanced 200 metres when the Marines came under fire from all directions and became cut off. In 1st Battalion’s sector, Second Lieutenant John H. Leims laid telephone lines across 400 metres of fire-swept ground before leading his men back to safety. He later returned twice in the dark to rescue wounded men. Leims was awarded the Medal of Honor. 2nd Battalion was also surrounded and although tanks managed to rescue Company E, Company F remained cut off until the following morning.

  3rd Division spent 8 March clearing the east coast and while RCT 21 cleared the cliff tops, a destroyer fired directly into the ravines below. In RCT 9’s sector Japanese soldiers were gathering to make a last stand east of Motoyama village, in an area known as Cushman’s Pocket after 2/9th Battalion’s commanding officer.

  These two Marines have just helped clear the pillbox in the background and they are waiting to move out towards their next objective. (NARA-127-GW-113803)

  Neither 3/21st not 2/9th Battalions could make any progress down the ravines on 9 March but patrols from both 1/21 and 3/9th Battalions reached the shoreline. 1/21st Battalion’s patrol was the first to the beach and the intelligence officer sent a canteen filled with sea water to the corps commander with a note; ‘For inspection, not consumption.’ It was just what General Schmidt wanted to hear. Japanese resistance had been light but General Erskine still ordered his battalions to dig in along the cliffs for the night; the general advance to the eastern shoreline could wait until morning.

  The following morning 1st Battalion reached the beach in RCT 21’s sector, however, 3rd Battalion ran into difficulties when a disabled Sherman tank came to life. An enterprising Japanese soldier had climbed inside and worked out how to operate its turret and gun. After knocking out one tank he held up 3rd Battalion until a bazooka team crawled forward to silence him.

  In RCT 9’s sector, both 3rd and 1st Battalions advanced down the ravines and then linked up on the beach. Although General Erskine was able to report that 3rd Division’s zone was free of organised resistance, it would take another six days to clear the remaining pockets of resistance along the cliffs. The delay was in part
due to the large number of replacements that the division had absorbed. There was no time for small unit training and their inexperience led to many needless casualties.

  4th Division Takes Minami and Higashi (D+15 to D+19)

  General Cates’ high hopes for a fresh attack on 6 March were quickly dashed as noted in the division’s operations report: ‘The results of fatigue and lack of experienced leaders is very evident in the manner in which the units fight.’ RCT 23 hardly moved while RCT 24 had done little to increase its stranglehold on the Turkey Knob.

  Cates changed his plans for 7 March; he would use a hammer and anvil strategy to crack the Meat Grinder while RCT 23 pushed for the coast. RCT 24 would hammer the Turkey Knob from northeast while the rest of RCT 25 hammered it from the southeast. 3/25th Marines formed the anvil west of the Amphitheatre, laying mines and erecting booby trapped barbed wire fences to stop the Japanese escaping. Machine guns and three 37mm guns armed with canister shells were dug in and camouflaged; mortars were also registered to hit the area in front of Captain Headley’s Marines.

  Disaster struck in front of Higashi when a rocket exploded in 2/23rd Marines’ command post before dawn; Major Davison and his executive officer, operations officer, adjutant and communications chief were all casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Dillon took over but 2nd Battalion could only advance 150 metres. RCT 24 struggled to make progress towards Higashi. RCT 25 also failed to advance southeast of the Meat Grinder. By the end of the day it was clear to General Cates that both his flanks had to hammer harder if they were going to drive the Japanese onto his anvil.