Iwo Jima 1945 Page 10

  The Japanese feared the flamethrower and their snipers kept a lookout for the distinctive shape of the fuel pack and nozzle. (NARA-127-GW-111006)

  4th Division made a surprise pre-dawn attack on 8 March but the Marines only moved a short distance before the Japanese were alerted and a day of bitter fighting followed. Although Cates did not know it, Captain Inoue, the Iwo Naval Land Force Commander, was killed in the fighting around Higashi.

  Since 1 March the division intelligence officer had warned that the risk of counterattacks would rise as the Japanese were pushed back to the coast: ‘POW interrogation reveals general counterattacks are discouraged by Jap commanders as long as gun and mortar positions are intact. After permanent positions have been overrun by Blue troops, counterattacks are to be made at the discretion of unit commanders.’ He was about to be proved right.

  An unusual amount of mortar, rocket and artillery fire hit 4th Division’s lines during the night of 8/9 March; it was being used to mask the sounds of 310th Independent Infantry Battalion’s 1st Company creeping through RCT 23’s lines. The troops were well equipped and while many carried demolition charges, some carried stretchers and planned to shout ‘Corpsman’ when they were spotted to fool the Marines. Shortly before midnight, shouts and screams signalled the alarm as 2/23rd Marines came under attack and Lieutenant Colonel Dillon’s men were fighting for their lives.

  The support ships lit the night sky with star shells while Company E fought to hold its position. A jeep with a trailer loaded with grenades and mortar shells saved the day when ammunition began to run out. Dillon’s Marines survived the night and at sunrise the Japanese withdrew. Mopping up continued until noon and around 800 Japanese dead were counted in 4th Division’s line, the majority around Company E; many more were later found in No Man’s Land.

  After the Japanese counterattack on the night of 8 March, RCT 23 moves out with fixed bayonets to check the area north of Higashi. (NARA-127-GW-142979)

  Japanese resistance reduced after the counterattack and 4th Division was about to take its revenge. While 2/23rd Marines could not advance far on the left flank, 3/24th Marines overcame the strongpoint covering Higashi village and advanced 300 metres towards Tachiiwa Point. The breakthrough released 1/24th and 1/25th Marines and they swung round to increase the stranglehold on the Turkey Knob.

  10 March marked the last coordinated corps and divisional artillery barrage on Iwo Jima because Japanese-held areas had become too small to target with anything larger than mortars. On 4th Division’s right flank, 2/23rd and 3/24th Marines advanced quickly past Higashi, leaving enemy strongpoints for infantry-engineer-tank teams to clear out with flamethrowers and demolitions. By mid afternoon, patrols were at the coast either side of Tachiiwa Point, having advanced over 1000 metres. Colonel Wensiger’s objective had been taken earlier than expected and the rapid advance was attributed to the number of Japanese killed during the previous night’s counterattack.

  Meanwhile, RCT 25 continued to close in on the Turkey Knob and this time 3rd and 2nd Battalions made contact on the far side around noon and had secured the hilltop bunker by nightfall. 1st Battalion also destroyed the final pocket of resistance in the area. After two weeks of bitter fighting, General Cates was pleased to report that the Meat Grinder had finally been taken. Although organised resistance was over in 4th Division’s sector, it would take another six days before the area was secure.

  4th Division suffered 4075 casualties between 25 February and 10 March in the Meat Grinder: nearly 850 killed or mortally wounded and over 3000 wounded or evacuated with combat fatigue. It left battalions short of men and companies were frequently exchanged to support assaults. In RCT 24, 1st and 2nd Battalions had to disband one company each because they had fewer than 150 men. 4th Division was also getting close to breaking point.

  CLEANING UP

  Lieutenant Colonel Melvin L. Krulewitch gathered over 400 officers and men under his command and they set to work checking out the caves and bunkers behind 4th Division’s front. It would take three days to mop up the rear areas and Krulewitch’s temporary unit then disbanded, its work done.

  With the end of organised Japanese resistance in sight, important command changes took place to accommodate the expansion of the airfield and base facilities on Iwo Jima. Brigadier General Ernest C. Moore of VII Fighter Command became the island’s Air Commander on 6 March. He also assumed command of 15th Fighter Group with 47th Fighter Squadron’s 28 P-51s (Mustangs) and 548th Night Fighter Squadron’s 12 P-61s (Black Widows). Major General James E. Chaney assumed his dual role as Commanding General, Army Garrison Forces, and Island Commander, Iwo Jima, the following day, taking responsibility for three things. Firstly, he would oversee control of the airfields; secondly, he would coordinate the island’s air defences; thirdly, he would direct the development of Iwo Jima’s base facilities.

  Marine Casualties, 25 February–10 March

  Killed Died of wounds Missing Wounded Fatigue Total

  5th Division 830 263 5 2974 220 4292

  3rd Division 627 200 4 2241 491 3563

  4th Division 642 205 1 2836 301 4075

  There were also several changes off shore. When the island-based 15th Fighter Group took over combat air patrol duties on 8 March the carrier planes were stood down and USS Enterprise’s carrier fleet headed for Ulithi. On 9 March the Eldorado left for Guam with Admiral Turner and his staff on board, while General Smith’s command post transferred to the Auburn. The Joint Expeditionary Force, Amphibious Support Force, Attack Force, Gunfire and Covering Force and Expeditionary Troops were reorganised as Task Group 51.21 under Admiral Hill, the Senior Officer Present Afloat.

  THE FINAL PHASE (D+20 TO D+35)

  By 11 March the battle was entering its final stages and while 5th Division still had some ground to cover along the north coast, 3rd and 4th Divisions only had to clear a few final pockets of resistance. Even so there was still a lot of hard fighting ahead and the Marines could not count on artillery, air and naval support because the Japanese were in such small areas.

  The heavy cruisers Tuscaloosa and Salt Lake City fired their final salvo on 12 March, although destroyers did continue to fire illumination shells until the 24th. The P-51 Mustangs of 15th Fighter Group flew their last combat support mission on 14 March while the Marine artillery ceased fire two days later. From then on the Marines would have to fight on with only their tanks and halftracks to help them.

  Although 5th Division had secured the west side of Kitano’s Gorge, it would take until 16 March before RCT 26 had secured the east side, including Hill 165 and Kitano Point, the northern point of the island. RCT 27 had cleared the cliffs with the help of 1/21st Marines by 15 March, securing everywhere but the gorge in 5th Division’s area.

  During 2/26th Marines’ fight to reach the ravine, Private Franklin E. Sigler took command when his leader was hit and led his squad towards a Japanese position, annihilating the crew with grenades. When they came under fire from the caves above, Sigler climbed the rocks and engaged the Japanese, only to be severely wounded. He returned to his company and continued to direct machine-gun and rocket barrages on caves. Sigler even carried three wounded squad members to safety and had to be ordered to retire for medical treatment; he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

  Clearing the last pockets of resistance, D+20 to D+25 (11–16 March).

  RCT amassed a large armoury of captured weapons and equipment during the clearing of Cushman’s Pocket. (NARA-127-GW-113119)

  As mentioned earlier, to the south 3rd Division had two pockets of resistance left to clear by 11 March, the cliff tops and ‘Cushman’s Pocket’ southwest of Hill 362C, named after Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Cushman, 2/9th Marines’ commanding officer. Colonel Kenyon planned a pincer attack to stop the Japanese escaping from the pocket and while his 3rd Battalion formed the left hook, 1st Battalion made the right hook. Both advanced with the help of Sherman tanks and by mid afternoon Cushman’s Pocket was surrounded.

  At the sam
e time 3/21st Marines attacked the southwest corner of the Pocket and it had an innovative weapon to help it. Several 7.2-inch rocket launchers designed for the M4A2 Sherman had been brought to Iwo Jima but the mechanics had discovered that they would not fit the new M4A3 tanks. Each launcher had 20 rocket tubes and they could fire 640 pounds of explosive to a range of 250 yards. The tank maintenance teams had mounted four on sleds. One launcher was dragged to the front by a tank and although it fired ten devastating salvos, 3/21st Marines could not advance through the maze of Japanese-held caves and spider traps.

  THE NIGHT WATCH

  Sometimes the Marine engineers and infantrymen worked all day long, destroying pillboxes and caves, with hardly a shot being fired. At night the Japanese crawled out of their caves and tunnels to throw grenades before disappearing back underground. Marine snipers kept a sharp look out for these night raiders, shooting many before they could cause any harm.

  RCT 9 continued the attack on Cushman’s Pocket with 1st and 3d Battalions attacking the east side while 3/21st continued to act as the anvil on the opposite side. Engineers worked with an armoured bulldozer to clear a road through the maze of rocky outcrops for the tanks and flame tanks, so the Marines could guide them towards the Japanese hideouts. Cushman’s Pocket was finally cleared on 14 March with the help of the last airstrikes of the campaign, ending organised resistance in 3rd Division’s area. Now it could turn north to help 5th Division deal with the last Japanese-held area.

  RCT 21 Advances to Kitano Point (D+25)

  On 16 March 3rd Division took over 5th Division’s right flank and RCT 21 advanced northwest behind the final naval barrage fired against Iwo. While 1st Battalion moved quickly along the coast, 2nd Battalion had to clear out many caves and spider holes as it closed in on Kitano Point. Occasionally Japanese soldiers broke cover and made a Kamikaze run towards a tank or group of Marines armed with demolition charges or grenades; most were shot down before they made contact. By early afternoon General Erskine was pleased to report that the north-east coast of Iwo Jima was clear.

  NO TIME TO LEARN

  By this stage of the battle, most of the Marine battalions had absorbed a large number of infantry replacements to replace casualties. While these men had been through training, they lacked combat experience and many were killed or injured before they could gain any. Unit efficiency suffered due to the high attrition rates. Casualties would have been much higher but for the help given by the flamethrower Shermans and the armoured bulldozers.

  4th Division’s Clears Tachiiwa Pocket (D+20 to D+25)

  By 11 March 4th Division faced its last pocket of Japanese resistance based in a maze of scrub-covered crevices and rocky outcrops to the south of Higashi village. Although RCT 23 was able to advance to the coast around Tachiiwa point and cover all beach areas, RCT 25 was unable to make any progress against the west side of the pocket. In the afternoon, a Japanese prisoner reported that he knew of 300 well armed troops in caves and tunnels and while they had plenty of ammunition and water, they had little food. He also told the interrogator that there was a Japanese general down there with them and it was assumed that he was Major General Senda, commanding 2nd Mixed Brigade.

  Early the following morning a surrender appeal was broadcast to General Senda and the morning’s attack was postponed while the prisoner led a Marine patrol towards the brigade commander’s supposed hideout. After two hours of trying to start the amplifier’s generator the patrol returned and RCT 25’s attack went ahead.

  Marines try to coax a wounded Japanese soldier out of his dugout. More often than not they chose suicide over surrender. (NARA-127-GW-111384)

  2nd Battalion advanced slowly down the ravines toward the coast supported by tanks and flame tanks while the rest of the regiment gave supporting fire. The area was so small that artillery, airstrikes and naval support could not be used and the Marines had to clear position after position with flamethrowers, bazookas, rifles, grenades and demolitions. The engineers followed, clearing a road through the rocks so that the flame tanks could get closer to the action. Time after time the Marines tried to entice trapped soldiers to surrender only to be answered with sniper or machine-gun fire.

  And so it continued for the next four days, advancing on average only five metres an hour, squeezing the Japanese pocket until the break came on the night of 15 March. A large group of Japanese troops attempted to infiltrate the Marine lines, hoping to cause as much damage as they could, but they were spotted and cut down before they could get far.

  All is not as it seems. The volcanic rock on Iwo Jima was soft enough to carve with a sharp knife and enterprising Japanese soldiers had sculptured this model of a tank to draw fire away from their bunker. (NARA-111-SC-208998)

  RCT 25 cleared the pocket the following morning and with the battle over, Colonel Lanigan’s Marines were able to relax and reflect on what they had been through. During the final sweep of the pocket, Corpsman Francis J. Pierce was on a reconnaissance mission when he saw two stretcher bearer parties hit by machine-gun fire. He gave covering fire for those who could escape while administering aid to those wounded. After winning the fire fight, he carried the two wounded men to safety. Pierce was wounded while aiding an injured Marine the following day but again he continued to giving covering fire; he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

  Further investigations revealed that the prisoner had been correct about General Senda; he had moved his brigade headquarters from the east of Hill 382 down to Higashi a few days earlier. However, the prisoner was incorrect about the number of Japanese in the area. 4th Division reckoned Senda had around 1500 army and navy troops under his command. Many of them were dead, scattered across the Iwo Jima’s battered landscape, or buried in caves and tunnels. Many more were still in hiding, waiting for an opportune moment to strike; hardly any had been taken prisoner.

  To Kitano Point (D+20 to D+25)

  On 11 and 12 March, 5th Marine Division advanced the final few yards up the ridge that had dominated its advance for the past few days. Once at the crest, they could go no further because they were faced with a steep-sided gorge and both sides had to be taken before it could be entered. General Rockey’s intelligence officer estimated that around 1000 Japanese troops were hidden in the caves in front of them and ‘there is no shortage of manpower, weapons, or ammunition in the area the Japanese have left to defend.’ While RCT 28 held the west side of the ravine, RCT 27 mopped up resistance to the south of it using flame tanks, ‘the one weapon that caused the Japanese to leave their caves and rock crevices and run.’

  By 15 March two sides of the ravine were secure but General Rockey would have to wait for 3rd Division to clear the east side, for 5th Division was by now a shadow of the unit that had landed three weeks earlier. Battalions were only company strength while companies were platoon strength and few of the men who had stepped ashore on D-Day were still with their units. The replacements were not of the same quality as the veterans and many were killed or injured before they learned how to survive.

  NOT FORGOTTEN

  Private George Phillips of 2/28th Marines was on night watch on 14 March when a hand grenade landed in the midst of his sleeping comrades. He shouted a warning and jumped on top of it; he was awarded the Medal of Honor for giving his life to save others.

  The Battle for Kitano Gorge (D+20 to D+35)

  At 09:30 on 14 March the official flag raising ceremony took place at VAC Headquarters and as the new flag went up, the original flag which had flown over Suribachi since D-plus-4 was taken down. Shortly afterwards General Smith, the Commander of Expeditionary Troops, and his staff left Iwo Jima by air; they had commanded the largest Marine tactical force ever to engage an enemy. Two days later Iwo Jima was declared officially secure after 26 days of bitter fighting. On the same day Major General Senda, 2nd Mixed Brigade’s commander, committed suicide.

  By 16 March the only pocket of organised resistance was in Kitano Gorge, around 700 yards long and 300 yards wide, southwest of Kitano
Point, where 500 Japanese soldiers were holding out under General Kuribayashi. While RCT 28 held the west side, RCT 26 had to take the east side and 1st Battalion had edged north to the coast, sealing off the ravine. The rest of RCT 26 cleared the area south of Kitano Point with the help of the final artillery preparation of the campaign.

  General Kuribayashi’s last stand in Kitano Gorge.

  For the next nine days RCT 26 edged its way round the rocky outcrops and down the narrow ravines while the Japanese fought back with rifles and machine guns. 5th Division’s report describes the difficult descent into the ravine:

  In attacking these positions, no Japanese were to be seen, all being in caves or crevices in the rocks and so disposed as to give an all-around interlocking, ghost-like defense to each small compartment. Attacking troops were subjected to fire from flanks and rear more than from their front. It was always difficult and often impossible to locate exactly where defensive fires originated … When the position was overrun or threatened, the enemy retreated further into his caves where he usually was safe from gunfire, only to pop out again as soon as the occasion warranted unless the cave was immediately blown.

  A huge igloo-shaped structure at the bottom of the ravine appeared to be the centre of resistance. Neither tank shells not demolition charges could penetrate the thick concrete. The Marines had to silence the surrounding positions while the engineers blasted a road down into the ravine so a bulldozer could get to the bunker. It then pushed earth and rocks against the structure’s door, sealing the Japanese inside. Five explosives charges totalling 8500lbs were set and then detonated, blowing the bunker to pieces.