Iwo Jima 1945 Read online

Page 8


  Colonel Pollock receives his new orders at 1/26 Marines makeshift headquarters while runners lie in the sand, waiting to pass on the message. (NARA-127-GW-112670)

  RCT 9’s attack in 3rd Division’s sector was a disaster and the only good news that Colonel Kenyon heard was that a flame tank had reached the far side of Hill Peter and burned out the escape tunnel. In 4th Division’s area, RCT 23 came under devastating fire on the slopes of Hill 382 but while 1st Battalion could not advance, 3rd Battalion could, owing to Private First Class Douglas T. Jacobson’s one-man crusade. After knocking out an anti-aircraft gun with his bazooka, he advanced towards the summit of Hill 382, destroying two machine-gun positions and two pillboxes. He then cleared a line of seven earth-covered rifle emplacements so that the rest of his platoon could get to the main one. Jacobson then joined another company, knocking out two pillboxes and a tank with his bazooka. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for destroying 16 enemy positions and killing around 75 Japanese.

  The Japanese were not going to give up the hill without a fight; ‘The enemy was determined to deny us Hill 382, and his unusually heavy mortar barrage on it twice forced our troops to retire after having occupied the hill area.’ Both battalions had to postpone their attempts to take the hill until the following day and dug in close to the summit.

  DEATH AT CLOSE QUARTERS

  25th Marines noticed that the ‘the enemy was now fighting to the death in pillboxes, foxholes and trenches in its area and is not retreating as he apparently formerly had done.’ The close proximity of the front lines meant that the artillery, the ships and the carrier planes could no longer give any assistance and to make matters worse, the tanks could not move through the rough terrain. The Marines had to fight on alone.

  SECURING THE ISLAND (D+8 TO D+19)

  On 28 February the engineers announced that Airfield 1 was open for business. It meant that the carrier-based planes could transfer ashore and continue to observe for the Marines’ artillery and hunt for Japanese battery positions. Their presence in the skies was enough to stop many guns crews firing, in case they were spotted. The first plane landed without any problems but the second plane was lost overboard before it could be launched. Ten more observation planes would transfer to Airfield 1 over the next two days.

  By now V Amphibious Corps had all of its three divisions in line and they could not ease up the pressure, they had to keep attacking. 5th Division faced a difficult advance along the north coast towards Hill 362-A while 3rd Division had to take Hill 199-O and Hill Peter before advancing towards Airfield 3; 4th Division faced the area known as the ‘Meat Grinder’. We shall consider each division in turn over the next seven days of the bloody battle to break the Japanese resistance on Iwo Jima.

  5th Division’s Advance to Hill 362A and Nishi Ridge (D+8 to D+14)

  RCT 27 took over from RCT 26 on 27 February and Colonel Wornham had instructions to take Hill 362-A, an area of high ground dominating the north side of the island. 2nd Battalion made slow but steady progress along the beach and cliff tops and by nightfall it had advanced 500 metres, straightening out the division’s front line.

  The advance northeast between D+8 and D+14 (27 February–5 March).

  The rest of RCT 27 ran into heavy opposition and while a nest of pillboxes stopped 1st Battalion after only 200 metres, 3rd Battalion struggled to advance because the tanks could not climb Hill 362A’s rocky slopes. Heavy machine-gun fire forced a halftrack armed with a 75mm gun to withdraw, leaving the Marines to tackle each bunker alone.

  V Corps designated a new objective line for 5th Division on 28 February. The O-3 line would place General Rockey’s Marines across the northern side of the Motoyama plateau, overlooking the sea. However, there was a long way to go as RCT 27 was still 300 metres from the top of Hill 362A. 3rd Battalion managed to reach the foot of the hill and by the afternoon patrols were looking for a way up to the fortified summit. During the advance, Corpsman John H. Willis administered first aid to many Marines until he too was wounded but did not wait to be discharged from the aid post and returned to his company. After hearing about a man injured in No Man’s Land he crawled out and dragged him to the safety of a shellhole. While Willis administering blood plasma, the Japanese threw grenades at him; he threw back eight but the ninth exploded in his hand and killed him; he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

  THE GREATEST SACRIFICE

  Gunnery Sergeant William G. Walsh’s platoon had been forced to fall back down a steep slope under heavy fire during 2/27th Marines’ attack but it regroupedand he led it back up to the summit despite being outnumbered. One group of Japanese made a last stand, showering Walsh’s platoon with grenades and when one landed in their trench, he dived to the ground and absorbed the force of the explosion. Walsh was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

  1st Battalion was also advancing onto the ridge south of Hill 362A aided by tanks when the Japanese counterattacked in the late afternoon. Although RCT 27 eventually stopped the attack, both of Colonel Wornham’s battalions had to withdraw; it was a disappointing end to a promising day.

  RCT 28 cleared the summit of Hill 362A on 1 March and advanced into the valley beyond only to find another line of fortifications waiting for them along Nishi Ridge. Colonel Liversedge’s Marines were crossing the valley, split for most part by a steep-sided rocky ravine, to get to them, when they came under heavy fire from machine guns, snipers and mortars. 1st Battalion tried to outflank the death trap to bring the ridge under fire but found it impossible to advance. Only 3rd Battalion could advance on the left flank and it did so until it was ordered to stop and tie in with the rest of the regiment.

  With bayonet fixed, a Marine risks sniper fire to call out mortar hits on his platoon, hoping to locate the Japanese position for the artillery. (NARA-127-GW-109954)

  On 2 March General Schmidt ordered General Rockey to make his main effort on the right to keep in contact with 3rd Division on the Motoyama Plateau. Although he had designated half the corps’ artillery to support RCT 26, the Japanese soldiers kept close to the Marines’ lines to avoid the barrage. The area was a mass of broken rocks and although there were few bunkers in the area, at times it seemed that there was a Japanese soldier hiding behind every rock and in every crevice. Even so, 3rd Battalion advanced on to the eastern end of Nishi Ridge, and Colonel Graham ordered the rest of the regiment forward to cover its flanks.

  SUPPORT FROM THE SEA

  Large support landing craft used their 40mm guns to target the caves and ravines on the west coast in support of 5th Division’s advance. The observers became experts at distinguishing between friendly and enemy troops and the division placed its own observer teams aboard on 28 February. The landing craft played a valuable role in stopping Japanese attempts to reach the supply dumps on the western beaches.

  In RCT 28’s zone to the west, 1st and 2nd Battalions put suppressive fire on Nishi Ridge while a tank dozer and an armoured bulldozer made a road across an anti-tank ditch. Once 5th Battalion’s tanks could get forward, so could the Marines, and they worked closely together as they inched up the slopes of Nishi Ridge. Colonel Liversedge was delighted to hear that 1st and 2nd Battalions reached the crest and even more so when they stopped the Japanese retaking it in the afternoon. RCT 28 now had a foothold on the high ground overlooking the north end of the island. 3rd Battalion had also edged forward along the rugged coastline, clearing over 60 caves.

  5th Division held an uneven line by nightfall on 2 March but the morning attack soon evened it out when all three battalions moved into extremely rugged terrain. It was later described by the division intelligence officer:

  Volcanic eruption has littered the whole northern end of the island with outcrops of sandstone and loose rock. The sandstone outcrops made cave digging easy for the Japs … Our troops obtained cover only by defilade or by piling loose rocks on the surface to form rock-revetted positions. A series of irregularly eroded, crisscrossed gorges with precipitous sides resulted in a
series of compartments of various shapes. These were usually small but some extended for several hundred metres. The compartments were lined with a labyrinth of natural and artificial caves which covered the approaches from all directions. Fields of fire were usually limited to 25 metres and a unique or at least unusual characteristic of the Japanese defensive positions in this area was that the reverse slopes were as strongly fortified as were the forward slopes.

  The fighting was at close quarters so neither the artillery, navy nor aircraft could not help and General Rockey’s Marines had to work alongside tanks and half-tracks or manhandle 37mm guns forward. All companies suffered heavy casualties in the rocky maze but they kept advancing and news that 2/26th Marines had reached the summit of Hill 362B in the late afternoon was welcomed by all.

  Three men of 26th Marines were awarded the Medal of Honor for deeds performed on 3 March. Platoon corpsman George E. Wahlen had risked his life several times on 26 February to save the men in his platoon despite his own injuries, even treating casualties of another platoon. He did the same during 2nd Battalion’s advance on 2 and 3 March, again ignoring his own injuries to save others.

  Marines have manhandled this howitzer into rough terrain where tanks could not travel so they could fire directly at a Japanese bunker. (NARA-127-GW-113644)

  Private First Class William R. Caddy of 3rd Battalion was advancing with his platoon leader and another Marine when a sniper forced them to find shelter in a shellhole. During the fight that followed a grenade landed amongst them and Caddy threw himself upon it; he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

  During the night hours, Japanese soldiers launched a surprise attack against 1st Battalion and when a grenade fell into Corporal Charles J. Berry’s foxhole he dived on the missile to save his comrades; he was also posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his sacrifice.

  Two men of 28th Marines were also awarded the Medal of Honor. Platoon corpsman Jack Williams went in front of 3rd Battalion’s lines to rescue a wounded Marine under fire. After dragging him into a shallow depression he administered first aid, screening the injured man with his body. He was hit three times but completed his work before dressing his own wounds. Williams was killed by a sniper while heading back after assisting another wounded man.

  Later that evening Sergeant William G. Harrell was guarding a company command post when the Japanese infiltrated 1st Battalion’s lines. He fought a number of soldiers for several hours, losing both hands and suffering a fractured thigh in the vicious battle. Almost incredibly, an exhausted and bleeding Harrell was found the following morning surrounded by dead Japanese; he was evacuated.

  After eight days of favourable weather it changed for the worse on 4 March. Overcast skies and showers forced air strikes to be cancelled while artillery and mortar observers struggled to spot targets. It left the Marines to edge forward slowly with the tanks and engineers.

  3rd Division’s Advance to Motoyama and Airfield 3 (D+8 and D+14)

  On 27 February RCT 9 cleared the high ground northeast of Airfield 2 and while 2nd Battalion inched up the slopes of Hill 199 Oboe, 1st Battalion reached the summit of Hill Peter. The Japanese had dug into the reverse slope and although Colonel Kenyon’s Marines came under fire as they moved over the crest, both battalions kept advancing. By the end of the day they had cleared the hills. Colonel Kenyon proudly wrote of his men’s achievements:

  Features of this action were the skill, determination, and aggressiveness displayed by our own troops; the unprecedented tenacity and defensive resourcefulness displayed by the enemy … the decisive aid rendered infantry troops by tanks; and finally, the excellent coordination of all supporting units with infantry maneuvers.

  A Marine hugs the ground during RCT 21’s drive towards Airfield 2. (NARA-127-GW-111389)

  The capture of Hill 199 Oboe was accelerated by one man: Private D. Watson. After his squad was pinned down he rushed the pillbox, firing into the embrasure before hurling a grenade inside; he then gunned down the survivors as they ran out. When his squad was pinned down a second time, he climbed the slope with his assistant and charged into the heart of the Japanese position, standing over the entrenchments, shooting anyone that moved. By the time the rest of his platoon reached Watson, he had killed around 60 Japanese; he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

  V Corps designated a new O-3 line on 28 February and 3rd Division’s objective was to clear the centre of Motoyama plateau, including the unfinished Airfield 3. RCT 21 took over the attack and while 1st Battalion was stopped by a strongpoint on Hill 362-A’s eastern slopes, 3rd Battalion advanced 400 metres towards Motoyama village. A gap was opening in the centre of RCT 21 but 2nd Battalion was unable to move through it to outflank the strong point in front of 1st Battalion. Despite the disappointment at not reaching Airfield 3, General Erskine was able to report that 3rd Division was through the centre of the Japanese main line of resistance.

  RCT 21 again tried to capture Airfield 3 on 1 March but a gap opened up in the centre of 2nd and 3rd Battalions’ advance. 3/9th Marines was ordered forward and it crossed the west end of the airfield’s runway before outflanking the Japanese position that had been holding up 1/21st Marines all day. A second attempt to advance in the afternoon made no further progress.

  MOVING FAST

  General Erskine and his regimental commanders were always looking for a weak spot in the Japanese defences to exploit. They probed them as far as they dared, using reserves to protect open flanks, and then widened the gaps by launching attacks from the sides of the openings. These daring tactics speeded up the rate of advance but the Marines had to watch out for overlooked bunkers and pillboxes during the mopping up process.

  Hill 362B overlooked RCT 21’s line of advance and General Erskine obtained permission to cross the division boundary to attack it on 2 March. But first RCT 9 had to seize Airfield 3 so it could give RCT 21 covering fire on Hill 362B. Unfortunately, RCT 9 failed to the cross the runway and Colonel Kenyon had to be satisfied with holding the southern perimeter of the runway while a platoon of tanks moved up to give covering fire. While 1/21st Battalion advanced around the north side of the runway and 3/9th Battalion seized the high ground at the east end, 2/21st Battalion reinforce the airfield perimeter in case the Japanese decided to counterattack across the runway.

  The battle for Airfield 3 continued on 3 March but while RCT 9 could make no progress, RCT 21 had seized Hill 357 by mid morning. The summit gave Major George A. Percy’s Marines an uninterrupted view of the east coast and there appeared to be no organised resistance between them and the sea. Colonel Withers was then ordered to turn southeast to outflank the Japanese positions in front of RCT 9. While 1st Battalion moved forward along the runway’s northern perimeter there was now a gap in the centre of the division. Shortly after midnight 200 Japanese crept across the runway hoping to infiltrate 3rd Division’s lines; they were soon stopped.

  4 March was a miserable day for the 3rd Division and the promises of a breakthrough the previous day were soon dashed. RCT 21 struggled to make any progress east of Airfield 3 while RCT 9 failed to get any closer to Hill 362-C. Both men and units were reaching the limits of their endurance and V Amphibious Corps had ordered 5 March to be a day of rest – or rather reorganisation in the morning and resupply in the afternoon – ready for an attack the following morning. While the Marines checked their equipment and distributed supplies, the tanks and bulldozers withdrew for some overdue maintenance.

  A young Marine watches intently for signs of life as he moves towards a Japanese bunker. (NARA-127-GW-112862)

  4th Division in the Meat Grinder (D+8 and D+14)

  4th Division faced the rugged area around the ruins of Minami village on 27 February. The area was criss-crossed by crevices and ridges but the main geographical features were known as Hill 382 (or Nidan Iwa), the Turkey Knob and the Amphitheatre; collectively they would become known as the Meat Grinder.

  The Japanese had dug camouflaged emplacements into the slopes
of Hill 382 and hidden tanks and artillery pieces in its crevices and ravines, linking many positions with a network of tunnels. They had also fortified the hollowed-out summit with artillery pieces and anti-tank guns. The huge rocky outcrop known as the Turkey Knob had a concrete communication post on the summit and Japanese observers had an uninterrupted view across the Meat Grinder. The Marines had to cross open ground to reach the only access to the summit and it was overlooked by a ridge – the Amphitheatre. The Japanese had built three tiers of concrete emplacements on the south-sloping hillside and they would have a grandstand view of the Marines’ every move. An intelligence report summarises the hell General Cates’ Marines faced:

  Marines of RCT 9 watch as P-51 Mustangs fly low to drop their 1000lb bombs on Japanese fortifications. (NARA-127-GW-178526)

  The volcanic, crevice-lined area is a tangled conglomeration of torn trees and blasted rocks. Ground observation is restricted to small areas. While there are sundry ridges, depressions and irregularities, most of the crevices of any moment radiate from the direction of Hill 382 to fan out like spokes generally in a south easterly direction providing a series of cross corridors to our advance and eminently suitable for the enemy’s employment of mortars. The general debris caused by our supporting fire provides perfect concealment for snipers and mortar positions. From the air, caves and tracks are observed everywhere, but the enemy’s camouflage discipline is flawless and it is the rarest occasion that an Aerial Observer can locate troops.