Iwo Jima 1945 Page 7

  General Schmidt had ordered Colonel Hartnel J. Withers’ RCT 21 to prepare to go ashore but reports concerning the number of broached landing craft, bogged down vehicles and wreckage on the beach made him reconsider his decision. As the wind increased in the early afternoon, so did the surf and RCT 21 had to re-embark and wait for new orders.

  General Cates also wanted the rest of his artillery ashore as soon as possible and although 3rd Battalion was launched mid morning it did not go ashore until mid afternoon and it was nightfall before its 105mm howitzers were engaging targets. 4th Battalion was launched into rough water in the afternoon and eight DUKWs floundered and sank, taking over half of the battalion’s weapons to the seabed. The survivors did not reach their gun pits until midnight. The first 155mm Howitzer battery belonging to corps artillery came ashore in the afternoon and tractors had to drag them one by one to their firing positions on the west coast.

  General Schmidt considered V Amphibious Corps’ situation as night fell on 20 February. While progress was being made, casualties were mounting and the beach situation was a growing concern. On the front line, the Marines faced a second disturbed night, as illumination shells and flares lit the sky and gunfire support ships shelled the shore. Yet again the Japanese seemed to be consolidating their positions and they only made two counterattacks; both were stopped in their tracks.

  The battle to the northeast began with an early morning barrage of artillery, rockets and naval guns, fired as close to the Marines’ positions as the gunners dared. 68 carrier-based planes then hit the area ahead of the Marines’ positions.

  Along the coast, RCT 27 faced automatic and rifle fire from hidden pillboxes and caves but Colonel Wornham’s Marines advanced 1000 yards alongside Sherman tanks towards O-1 line. In 4th Division’s sector 23rd and 25th Marines came under heavy fire from positions covering Airfield 2 when they tried to advance. The tanks ran into minefields covered by anti-tank guns and it took the engineers time to crawl forward and clear a route forward. 23rd Marines advanced 100 metres while 25th Marines advanced less than 50 metres.

  CLEARING THE BUNKERS

  Sergeant Ross F. Gray, 1/25th Marines, cleared a way through a minefield to reach the emplacements which were pinning down his platoon. He then returned for a satchel charge and used it to destroy the first bunker; he repeated the process until all six bunkers had been silenced. Gray was killed in action six days later. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions.

  In RCT 24’s sector, Captain Joseph J. McCarthy’s company was pinned down on the edge of Airfield 2 so he gathered together a demolitions and flamethrower team to accompany his rifle squad. They crossed the exposed runway under heavy fire and knocked out two pillboxes on the ridge beyond. McCarthy went on to risk his life several times to save the lives of his men; he was awarded the Medal of Honor. 1/24th Marines advanced the furthest on the right flank, moving 300 yards through the pillboxes and bunkers along the cliffs overlooking East Boat Basin.

  General Rockey had left USS Cecil (APA 96) in the early afternoon and he set up 5th Division headquarters at the southern end of Airfield 1. Brigadier General Franklin A. Hart, 4th Marine Division’s assistant division commander, was already ashore and while he recommended using RCT 21 to relieve RCT 23, it would be impossible to relieve the battered 25th Marines.

  The improved weather conditions on D+2 meant that 21st Marines could land on Yellow Beaches during the afternoon and by the evening Colonel Withers’ men were in reserve near Airfield 1. However, Blue 1 Beach was under heavy fire and an exploding ammunition dump was endangering everything on Blue and Yellow Beaches. Hart also recommended leaving the division headquarters on board USS Bayfield (APA 33) until the following day.

  The night of 21/22 February was another one of harassing fire, local counterattacks and infiltration for the Marines. Around midnight 200 enemy troops were spotted advancing from Airfield 2 towards 4th Division, but artillery and naval gun fire dispersed them before they reached the Marines’ lines.

  The action was not confined to the island on 21 February; around 50 Japanese planes began a three-hour Kamikaze attack against the carrier fleet in the late afternoon. The suicide pilots crashed their planes into three carriers: the Bismarck Sea (CVE 95) was sunk; the Saratoga (CV 3) was badly damaged and withdrawn; and Lunga Point (CVE 94) was hit but continued operations. The Keokuk (AKN 4) and LST 477 were also damaged but the LST was able to land its tanks before withdrawing.

  The Advance towards Airfield 2 and Minami (D+3 and D+4)

  Offshore, part of Admiral Spruance’s fast carrier force, Task Force 58, left Iwo Jima on 22 February and headed north so it could resume its air strikes against Tokyo. It left behind Task Group 58.5, with the carrier Enterprise, the cruisers Baltimore and Flint, and Destroyer Squadron 54, to provide night fighter protection. The planes on Admiral Durgin’s carrier support force would take over close support missions from now on. These planes were based on smaller carriers (CVEs) and they also had to carry out combat air patrols, anti-submarine patrols and searches for crashed aircrew. The change meant that the Marines would sometimes have to go without air support.

  Cold, drizzling rain and a driving wind soaked the Marines to the skin on D+3 while the wet volcanic ash clogged up their weapons and clung to their boots. The advance towards the O-1 Line had been slower than anticipated while casualties had been higher. Fatigue was becoming a problem after three days in action and both Generals Rockey and Cates were anxious to relieve some of their front line units so they could rest and absorb replacements.

  While the rest of 4th Division cleared Airstrip 1, 24th Marines fought their way onto the high ground above the Quarry, losing over 100 men; many of them from friendly fire. There are anxious faces all along the front as zero hour approaches. (NARA-127-GW-111245)

  Colonel Grahams’ RCT 26 relieved RCT 27 in 5th Division’s sector but a combination of bad luck, rain and heavy resistance meant that 3rd Battalion could not advance on the right flank. Both Lieutenant Colonel Trotti and the operations officer, Major Day, were killed, leaving a company commander in charge. Although 2nd Battalion advanced 400 yards along the coast by nightfall it had to withdraw to maintain contact with 3rd Battalion.

  On 4th Division’s left flank, RCT 21 (attached from 3rd Division) took all morning to relieve RCT 23 and Colonel Withers’ Marines then found a maze of pillboxes covering Airfield 2 waiting for them. Tanks were unable to cross the rough terrain and Marines edged alone up the rocky slopes towards them. While heavy rain blinded both the carrier planes and the Marine artillery observers, the Japanese artillery and mortar crews continued firing on registered targets.

  On 4th Division’s right flank, RCT 25 was hoping that its 1st Battalion would reach the O-1 Line. While Major Mee’s men advanced 200 yards, they had to withdraw due to RCT 21’s lack of progress on its flank. A rocket attack in 3rd Battalion’s sector flushed 200 Japanese soldiers out into the open and the Marines cut them down with their machine guns. It was one of the largest groups of enemy soldiers seen together on Iwo Jima.

  The rain and mist continued into the night, and the Japanese took advantage of the conditions to make two counterattacks. After midnight, a group of Japanese swam ashore on the western beaches and infiltrated 27th Marines’ camp in 5th Division’s reserve. It took until dawn to hunt them all down. Around 100 Japanese also infiltrated 4th Division’s sector.

  On 23 February RCT 26 was supposed to take the bluffs that dominated 5th Division’s sector on the western side of the island. Colonel Graham’s men could then fire onto the Japanese positions protecting Airfield 2 in 4th Division’s sector and he had permission to cross the divisional boundary if necessary. However, it was the Japanese around Airfield 2 who brought RCT 26 under heavy enfilade fire and General Rockey had to report that his Marines had made no progress. The fact that all his armour was re-equipping and reorganising had not helped.

  On 4th Division’s left, RCT 21’s attack across Airfield 2 was doomed without sup
porting fire from RCT 26 and Colonel Withers’ eventually ordered his men to dig in along the southern perimeter of the runway. Corporal Hershel W. Williams began the day by escorting the tanks through a network of pillboxes. He then went on to spray each one with his flamethrower while his riflemen used demolition charges to knock them out. Williams was awarded the Medal of Honor for his part in RCT 21’s advance.

  On 4th Division’s right, RCT 24 relieved RCT 25 and had advanced 300 yards before it was ordered to stop due to the holdup in RCT 21’s sector. The problem for V Amphibious Corps was that a delay in one sector had a knock-on effect on both flanks. The advance had to be even all along the line to stop gaps opening up, gaps that the Japanese would infiltrate.

  While the battle raged around Airfield 2, the logistics operations along the beach were starting to become organised. D+3 had been a difficult day due to the poor weather and the rough surf stopped small craft and amphibious vehicles collecting the wounded. LST 807 had unloaded its supplies and the decision was taken to leave it on the beach as a temporary hospital ship; over 200 injured men were treated on the ship during the night. The calmer weather on D+4 meant that unloading could begin in earnest as the LSMs rushed vital supplies from the cargo ships to the shore, including 2500 rounds of badly needed 81mm ammunition. 25 tanks of Major Holly H. Evans’ 3rd Tank Battalion also landed. While the Japanese artillery fire on the beach had diminished, the routes off the beach were being improved. All these factors allowed the shore parties to tidy up the chaos. However, the weather forecast predicted a shift in the wind direction over the next 48 hours making the surf too rough to land on the eastern beaches. The Attack Force Commander ordered V Amphibious Corps to prepare the western beaches for unloading and the corps engineers spent all day preparing them for the shore parties.

  Lieutenant Michael F. Keleher, a battalion surgeon, described Blue Beach: ‘Wrecked boats, bogged-down jeeps, tractors and tanks; burning vehicles; casualties scattered all over.’ (NARA-127-GW-109604)

  General Cates had left USS Bayfield on the morning of 23 February and opened 4th Division’s advance command post east of Airfield Number 1. With both the 4th and 5th Division commanders ashore, General Schmidt landed and discussed plans for renewing the attack in the morning.

  Clearing Airfield 2 and the Advance to Charlie-Dog Ridge (D+5 to D+7)

  The attack on 24 February opened with a naval bombardment of the Japanese positions covering Airfield 2. The corps artillery then joined in and finally the carrier planes flew over, carpeting the area with bombs and rockets. 5th Division had to hold its ground until 4th Division had cleared the ridge running between them and General Cates had placed it at the top of his priorities.

  RCT 21’s armoured support ran into trouble on the taxiways connecting Airfield 1 to Airfield 2. Half the tanks were delayed by mines on the western taxiway and then stopped by anti-tank guns; after five had been knocked out, the rest withdrew. The other half had to wait until a route had been cleared through the minefield on the eastern taxiway. Eventually twelve tanks joined RCT 21 and by midday 3/21st Marines had crossed the runway and reached the high ground on the far side. Three times the Marines cleared the summit at bayonet point but each time they were driven off by Japanese artillery fire.

  3rd Battalion persevered and Colonel Withers was pleased to report that his Marines had control of the runways having advanced nearly 800 yards. Tanks then accompanied 2nd Battalion onto the runway but only one company could get across. At the same time RCT 26 in 5th Division’s sector was making good progress west of Airfield 2. In fact it was advancing too fast and its 3rd Battalion had to withdraw due to enfilade fire from 3rd Division’s sector.

  Tanks often struggled to get across the tortuous terrain to help the Marines, but once they did the Japanese often withdrew. This Sherman, nicknamed Bed Bug, crawls forward past a grim faced group of Marines as they wait for the order to advance. (NARA-127-GW-109666)

  In 4th Division’s sector, 2/24th Marines advanced quickly until it came under fire from Charlie-Dog Ridge at the eastern end of Airfield 2’s runway. Machine guns, snipers and anti-tank guns forced the Marines to look for cover and then the Japanese mortars and artillery zeroed in. Air and naval support were refused because the Marines were too close to the Japanese positions, so they had to drag four machine guns and a 37mm gun forward. Once they were in position, G Company renewed its advance, burning and blasting its way to the top of the ridge. When Company I had done the same, Company F advanced to Airfield 2’s runway making contact with RCT 21.

  The southeast extension of Charlie-Dog Ridge was known as the Amphitheatre and the Japanese had a perfect field of fire over RCT 24’s line of advance. 3rd Battalion was hit by a devastating crossfire as it moved forward while the Japanese artillery and mortars knew exactly where to fire. The Marines were soon pinned down and the battalion’s mortars had to fire white phosphorous smoke to shield the medics while they evacuated the casualties; even the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Vandegrift Jr was wounded.

  Officer casualties were heavy but the survivors rallied their men and led them towards their objectives. Two company commanders discuss how to coordinate their covering fire. (NARA-127-GW-111107)

  Meanwhile, 1st Battalion advanced 500 yards through the maze of ravines and caves along the coast, and although they were always under fire, they rarely saw the enemy. A report to the Japanese Naval Headquarters reported the bizarre battle RCT 24 was fighting. ‘At the present time there is the unusual situation in the southern sector area of our troops all being underground, while the enemy troops are above ground.’

  During the morning General Schmidt left USS Auburn and came ashore to assume command of the battle. Although 4th Division had been unable to make any progress on the right, the salient in the centre of V Amphibious Corps’ centre had been eliminated where 3rd Division had made significant progress across Airfield 2. He found all manner of command posts, artillery positions, supply dumps and medical installations in the shadow of Mount Suribachi. 3rd Division’s command post only added to the congestion but General Erskine needed to be ashore to command the battle around Airfield 2. The rest of 3rd Division was coming ashore across Red 2 and Yellow 1 Beaches, an area renamed Black Beach. Rough surf conditions meant that LCMs were being used to transfer everything from ship to shore and it took all day to get 9th Marines and 3rd Tank Battalion ashore; 3rd Division’s artillery, 12th Marines could only land a battery of 75mm pack howitzers.

  3rd Division took over Airfield 2 on 25 February and RCT 21 reverted to its control. General Graves B. Erskine had orders to advance beyond the airfield and across the Motoyama Plateau to Airfield 3. While the plateau was relatively flat, the Japanese had fortified it with bunkers, pillboxes, minefields and tank ditches. Observers on the hills either side of 3rd Division’s sector would also be able to bring down mortar and artillery fire where needed.

  While RCT 9 passed through RCT 21, a battleship and two cruisers targeted the Japanese positions facing 3rd Division. Then the corps artillery shelled the area north of Airfield 2 followed by airstrikes. Even so, 1st Battalion suffered many casualties as it crossed Airfield 2’s runway and the high ground beyond. 2nd Battalion could not advance along the low ridge on the west side of the airfield and nine of the 26 tanks supporting its attack were knocked out. Colonel Howard N. Kenyon had to take the ridge to safeguard 1st Battalion’s position so 3rd Battalion was released from reserve to help 2nd Battalion. It too became pinned down and fell back in confusion after two company commanders were killed. It took until nightfall to stabilise the situation but 2nd Battalion was finally established on the all-important ridge.

  V Amphibious Corps hit the Amphitheatre and Minami areas in front of 4th Division with all the artillery, naval gunfire and carrier planes it could muster. LVT(A)s from Company A, 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion also tried to give support from the sea but the choppy conditions meant they had to withdraw.

  A young Marine waits for orders to move o
ut. He still has scraps of waterproofing attached to the end of his rifle. (NARA-127-GW-112202)

  3/23rd Marines had taken over the eastern end of Airfield 2 on the morning of 25 February and it had to advance alone onto Charlie-Dog Ridge while the engineers cleared a route for its armoured support. Tanks could not reach RCT 24 either and 1st and 2nd Battalions only advanced 100 yards towards the Amphitheatre.

  By D+6 General Schmidt was aware that the landing craft and ships had to be withdrawn soon so they could be prepared for the invasion of Okinawa. The beaches had to be cleared so they could be unloaded as quickly as possible, with ammunition being the number one priority. The eastern beaches were not enough, especially if the wind changed to an easterly direction, and the rest of the western beaches had to be developed. (The western beaches would eventually be codenamed as follows from north to south: Orange 1 and 2, White 1 and 2, Brown 1 and 2 and Purple.) It meant that 5th Division had to clear the Japanese from the high ground overlooking them.

  5th Division had to advance on 26 February even though the ridge on its right was still in Japanese hands. While 2/27th Battalion advanced 400 yards along the coast, it was the division’s only success. The rest of RCT 26 was hit by crossfire from camouflaged bunkers to their front and hidden guns on the ridge to their flank. Neither 2nd nor 3rd Battalions had moved far when low cloud obscured the island, making it impossible for the artillery or the tanks to spot targets. There was still 900 yards to go to 5th Division’s next objective – the high ground around Hill 362A – and the Japanese could watch the Marines every move from the summit.